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Abstract 
Globally, evidences abound in literature confirming a strong nexus between corruption and infrastructural decay. 
This paper attempts to articulate descriptively the link between corruption and infrastructural decay in Nigeria. 
Two selected infrastructural sub-sectors (electricity and governance) were briefly examined and used to 
demonstrate the correlation between corruption and the current state of infrastructural decay. It was very glaring 
from the simple correlation analysis that it is not absolute lack of funds that has caused infrastructural decay but 
outright mismanagement of funds (corruption) that is principally responsible for the level of infrastructural decay 
in Nigeria. On the basis of this analysis, some policy options were suggested. In essence, the promotion and 
institutionalization of good governance, long term infrastructural planning and public private partnership in the 
provision of infrastructures were among the policies recommended. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite periodic fluctuations in Nigeria’s major export (crude oil) prices, the country earns enough 
foreign exchange/revenue to “modernize” and provide infrastructural facilities to develop the economy. In the 
last decade, Nigeria has experienced remarkable growth in Gross Domestic product and perhaps its per capita 
component at an average of 6.5 percent and 2,600 US dollars respectively (African economic outlook, 2012). 
This growth is not completely unconnected with the revenue windfall from petroleum which normally should be 
used to provide and modernize existing soft-core and hard-core infrastructures in Nigeria. To the contrary, the oil 
earnings has led to the execution of ambitious and unviable projects which have served as a conduit pipe for the 
emerging business class and the bureaucratic/political bourgeoisie to siphon public funds into personal pockets at 
the expense of infrastructural development. Perhaps, this explains why Nigeria’s assumed impressive economic 
growth has nothing to show in terms of concrete development as basic macroeconomic indices such as 
unemployment is high, 23.9%, inflation rate is double digit high, 12.1%, per capita income is low and below the 
African average of 3,000 US dollars, investment is barely 18.8% of GDP and above all, 70% of the population 
live below the poverty line (Atuanya, 2012). 
  Infrastructural decay around the country can to a greater extent be traced to corruption and lack of 
accountability and transparency by public/private office holders in Nigeria. Corruption as a phenomenon is a 
global problem and exists in varying degrees in different countries (Agbu, 2003). Irrespective of the type of 
government, be it democratic or dictatorial, capitalist or socialist, corruption exists. Corrupt practices are as old 
as the world (Lipset and Gabriel, 2000). In Nigeria, it is one of the many unresolved challenges that have made 
development not to be human centered. Corruption is a long-term major political and economic challenge to 
Nigeria in the provision of infrastructures (Ayobolu, 2006). World Bank studies put corruption at over $1 trillion 
per accounting year for up to 12% of the Gross Domestic Product of nations like Nigeria, Kenya and Venezuela 
(Nwabuzor, 2005, Ubi et al, 2012). It has been the primary reason behind the country’s difficulties in developing 
fast. This is evident in Transparency International’s consistent rating of Nigeria as one of the top three most 
corrupt countries in the world (Ribadu, 2003, ICPC, 2006). Although, corruption is rife in public organizations 
than private, corruption and inefficiency are characteristics of service delivery in Nigeria (Amadi, 2004). Up till 
2011, Nigeria has remained among the top ten leading countries on corruption according to transparency 
international.  
Thus, the fact that the country has not achieved success in significantly reducing or wiping out official 
corruption from our polity cannot be denied. It is argued that this seeming failure has been due largely to the fact 
that the transmission mechanism by which official corruption is perpetrated (practiced and condoned) and by 
which the perpetration impairs infrastructural development and by extension “concrete” economic development 
has not been properly articulated and documented. In spite of the challenges that corruption has posed to Nigeria, 
it is only recently that a systematic research has been carried out into the dimensions of corruption and its effects 
on the Nigerian society at large. This study aims at contributing to the literature through investigating 
empirically, if there exist any correlation between corruption and infrastructural decay in Nigeria (with 
electricity and governance infrastructural subsectors being the key areas of interest). The uniqueness of the study 
which is largely descriptive in nature lies in the use of non parametric statistical analysis to show the relationship 
between corruption and infrastructural decay in a depressed economy like Nigeria. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows: section 2 discusses conceptual and theoretical issues. Thereafter, some dimensions of 
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corruption and infrastructural decay in Nigeria are highlighted in section 3 and this is finally followed by 
concluding remarks in section 4.   
2. Conceptual and theoretical issues 
An examination of the different threads of opinion in the literature on corruption and infrastructure as 
well theoretical explorations are necessary to enable us appreciate the issues within the context under study. 
2.1 Corruption 
  The level and types of corruption have changed between historical epochs and across countries. In 
recent times, its frequency, variance and sophistication have reached unprecedented levels, especially in less 
developed countries, hence, the attention it has attracted from scholars in different disciplines including 
economics, law, sociology, psychology and criminology. A clear cut definition of the word corruption is 
however difficult. This is because corruption covers a wide range of morally offensive or criminal acts; thus, its 
precise definition is not easy. Otite (1998) defined corruption as the perversion of integrity or state of affairs 
through bribery, favour or moral depravity. Corruption involves the injection of additional but improper 
transactions aimed at changing the normal course of events and altering judgments and positions of trust. Gray 
and Kaufmann (1998) defined corruption as the use of public office for private gains. To economists, corruption 
may be referred to as ‘rent seeking’ activity. This is an activity that illegitimately yields income over and above 
what a factor needs for retention in a particular employment. Rent seeking is mostly associated with unfair 
exploitation of loopholes in official policies. Thus, smuggling, bunkering and black marketing are parts of rent 
seeking. There are so many definitions of corruption but for lack of space, we will limit ourselves to these few. 
On a general note, corruption is simply the misuse of public resources for selfish gains.  
Because of the ambivalence associated with corruption (i.e., the great deal of controversy concerning its 
desirability or otherwise) in many societies, a variety of terms are used in referring to corrupt acts in these 
societies. Thus frequently, one hears of such terms as ‘kick back’ and ‘side deals’. In Nigeria, corruption has 
been referred to by expressions such as ‘man know man’, giving of ‘kola’, “runs”, use of ‘long legs’  “language 
power” and “power point” etc. Based on the causes of corruption, it has been classified to include political 
corruption, economic corruption, bureaucratic corruption, judicial corruption and Moral corruption (Umo, 2003). 
But it is not the place of this study to dwell extensively on classification of corruption. 
Looking at the theoretical perspectives, Social control theory of corruption posits that without effective 
control measures; deviance becomes the norm (Weidman, 2007). According to this theory, humans rationalize on 
what is more rewarding and proceed to take action on that basis. Thus, in the absence of restraining penalty or 
sanctions, there is nothing to deter people from fraudulently enriching themselves at the expense of others. As 
this phenomenon snowballs, it actually becomes accepted as a norm: as is currently the case with some forms of 
corruption in many African countries including Nigeria. 
Also, the socio-cultural theory as stated by levy (1999) holds that corruption is as a result of imposition 
of western methods of governance and upholding that system as opposed to our traditional system. Corruption in 
developing countries is often associated with inharmonious relationship between traditional values and western 
norms, which are evidenced in modernistic unbridled acquisition tendencies. In the first place, the public service 
was structured to serve the interest of the colonial masters with the inherent contradictions between the colonial 
interest and current nationalistic goals. These contradictions have continued to impede the efficiency of public 
service as governmental machinery in the post colonial era. In its origin, the public service was based on colonial 
hostility to indigenous development interests. It can thus be concluded that corruption is an imported phenomena 
which came with colonization. 
2.2 Infrastructure 
While some economists associate infrastructure with economic and social overhead capital, which 
includes facilities such as power, transport and communications, others see it as embracing social overhead 
which includes facilities for water supplies, education, health, information, town and country planning and social 
welfare. According to Oshikoya et al (1999), Ubi et al (2011), the definition of infrastructure falls into two 
complementary categories, namely: social or soft-core infrastructure and physical or hard-core infrastructure. 
Soft-core infrastructure pertains to the provision of healthcare and education, type of governance, 
transparency/accountability and property right and is often viewed as the driving force for economic activity. On 
the other hand, hard-core infrastructure pertains to physical structures and comprises telecommunication, power, 
transportation, water supply and sewage. They are generally viewed as the wheels of economic activity. 
Infrastructure; be soft-core or otherwise, provides the basic foundation on which the take-off into self-sustaining 
growth is not only possible but is also assured and cumulative (Jhingan, 2003).    
At the theoretical level, Albert Hirschman’s theory of unbalancing development can be used to justify 
the treatment of infrastructure as a ‘lead’ sector whose expansion promotes and supports the development of 
other sectors. In Hirschman’s view, since no LDCs has sufficient resources for investing simultaneously in all 
sectors of the economy, “investments in strategically selected industries or sectors of the economy will lead to 
new investment opportunities and so pave the way to further economic development”. Hirschman (1958) as cited 
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by Jhingan (2003) identifies convergent and divergent series of investments; convergent investments appropriate 
more external economies than they create while divergent investments create more external economies than they 
appropriate. Accordingly, Hirschman recommends a deliberate strategy of unbalancing the economy by 
investing first in infrastructure like electricity and perhaps good governance (to mention but a few) which 
permits and invites direct productive activities (DPA).  
3.  Methodology 
Descriptive and Simple correlation analysis are employed in this study to evaluate the nature and degree of 
the relationship between electricity generation (represented as ELEGEN) and corruption (represented as CORR) 
on one hand, and between governance and corruption on the other hand. Budget deficit (represented as BDF) is 
used as a proxy for measuring governance. This is because it is believed that budget deficit is supposed to 
enhance governance infrastructure. The data for the study which covers a period of 1974-2010 were obtained 
from Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin, 2011 except the data on corruption that was sourced from 
transparency international corruption index, 2011.     
4.  Results and Discussion 
4.1 Some dimensions of corruption and infrastructural decay in Nigeria. 
Given that infrastructural decay in Nigeria is legendary, it has been widely accepted by scholars that 
government contracts and distribution of government benefits are the foremost grounds for corruption which is 
responsible for the abandonments and decay of infrastructures littered all over Nigeria. However, we intend to 
use two selected infrastructural sub-sectors to demonstrate some dimensions of the research problem. The choice 
represents both the hard-core and soft-core infrastructures. 
TABLE 1: ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY BALANCE SHEET, 2010. 
YEAR 
AVERAGE 
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION IN MW 
AVERAGE 
ELECTRICITY 
SUPPLY IN MW 
 
AVERAGE POWER 
LOSS IN 
TRANSMISSION  IN MW 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
OF POWER LOSS 
1970-1980 424.7 332.8 92.3 21.7 
1981-1990 1,189.4 784.5 404.9 34.0 
1991-2000 1,756.6 1,016.4 740.3 42.1 
2001-2010 3,530.5 1,955.9 1,574.6 44.5 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2009. Columns 4 and 5 are computed by the Authors. 
In the case of electricity, the Nigerian government claimed to have spent over N1 trillion between 1999 
and 2007 on power, yet the quantity and quality of power supply is grossly inadequate (Obayelu, 2007). This is 
vividly captured in table 1 above as there seem to be no remarkable difference in electricity supply before 2007 
and after 2007 when the money was assumed to have been invested in the power sector. An examination of the 
table indicates that there is no significant difference in the percentage of electricity lost in transmission before 
2007 and after 2007. Although, there might be a nominal increase in electricity generation and supply between 
2007 -2012, the trend in electricity lost in transmission remains the same.  
TABLE 2: CORRELATION ANALYSIS/RESULTS  
 BDF CORR ELEGEN 
BDF 1.000000 0.686866 0.393923 
CORR 0.686866 1.000000 0.719667 
ELEGEN 0.393923 0.719667 1.000000 
Source: Calculated by the authors using E-views 3.1. 
Also, from the simple correlation analysis between electricity generation (ELEGEN) and corruption 
(CORR) in table 2, it is discovered that the two variables are highly positively correlated given the value of 0.72. 
That means they move in the same direction. The implication is that, though, huge sums of money have been 
invested in the electricity sub-sector over the years; this has only enhanced corruption which has led to a mere 
nominal increase in electricity generation/supply. Perhaps, the amount of money spent is actually in peoples 
“pockets” who refused to invest to improve electricity generation/supply in Nigeria. They preferred to satisfy 
their unquenchable desire for wealth acquisition. 
This result also strengthens Obayelu’s (2007) position, who asserted that a nationwide corruption 
survey in 2007 had indicted the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) as being one of the most corrupt 
infrastructural institutions in Nigeria. In Nigeria, (Power Holding of Nigeria (PHCN) formerly NEPA), the 
organization that is solely responsible for the supply of electricity infrastructure to the public has failed woefully 
to deliver on its statutory responsibility.  This, perhaps, is due to “weak and corrupt capacity” to dutifully carry 
on its assignment. Power outages in Nigeria result in losses equivalent to 10 per cent of total sales. Ninety seven 
(97) percent of Nigerian firms experience power outages. On the average, such outages last for 196 hours per 
month, approximately, 8 days. Large firms in the manufacturing sector are adversely affected by such outages. 
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Faced with this situation, 86 per cent of firms have their own generators, which produce 61 per cent of their 
electricity needs (ICA, 2009).  
TABLE 3: COUNTRY COMPARISON OF ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRAINTS 
Indicator Nigeria 
2006 
Kenya 
2007 
Venezuela 
2006 
Brazil 
2003 
Indonesia 
2003 
S/Africa 
2003 
India 
2005 
China 
2003 
% of firms experienced power 
outages 
 
97 
 
85 
 
21 
 
64 
 
48 
 
N/A 
 
77 
 
N/A 
% firms with own generator  
86 
 
70 
 
N/A 
 
17 
 
39 
 
10 
 
59 
 
19 
Source: ICA surveys, 2009. 
In comparison with other countries, table 3 reveals that the percentage of firms experiencing power 
outages  is highest in Nigeria. The implication of this undesirable development is the creation of a limited 
capacity in the economy to raise productivity. The manufacturing sector which is usually considered as the 
engine of growth has continued to be characterized by low production as a result of inefficiencies associated with 
corruption in infrastructural supply in which inadequate/irregular electricity supply by PHCN is paramount. 
There are over 800 collapsed industries in Nigeria and over 37 factories folded up in 2009. Besides, high and 
multiple levies and taxations being paid by these companies, energy crises have combined to make the cost of 
doing business in Nigeria to be very exorbitant (Adeloye, 2010; Onifade, 2011).  Ekpo (2008), as cited by Atser 
(2008), observed that the most critical effect of infrastructure on investment is power (electricity) supply which 
unfortunately had been on the low side in Nigeria. According to Ekpo (2008), statistics from state owned 
electricity utility firm (PHCN) showed that electricity supply is about 3,400 megawatts in a country of 150 
million people whose national consumption is in excess of 10,000 megawatts. Against this backdrop, the failure 
of PHCN to regularly supply electricity is attributed but not limited to lack of transparency in management and 
corruption. 
In terms of governance infrastructure which drives economic activity and paves the way for accelerated 
socio-economic growth, ECA (2002), stated that good economic outcomes are derived from good governance. 
Good governance is a broad concept encompassing a wide range of issues. Good governance exists in those 
economies where the institutions of government have the capacity to formulate, implement and manage 
resources efficiently. Also, these institutions have the capacity to enforce sound policies/regulations and can as 
well be monitored and be held accountable. Above all, good governance exists where there is respect for the 
rules and norms of economic interaction and in which economic activity is unimpeded by corruption and other 
activities inconsistent with public trust. The key elements contributing to an environment of good governance are 
transparency, accountability, an enabling environment for private sector development and growth. Good 
governance is necessary in order to enhance the capacity of the state to deliver on its economic mandate. That 
mandate includes eradicating poverty through the provision of a sustainable means of livelihood (gainful 
employment) and improving economic growth. However, the majority of African countries (including Nigeria) 
now lack the capacity to meet that mandate due to deficiencies in their governance structures. Those deficiencies 
include the lack of an appropriate institutional framework to guide economic policy-making and execution; a 
weak civil society unable to hold government accountable for its actions; a similarly weak or uninterested 
parliament; and the lack of consultative mechanisms for engaging the private commercial interests for inputs into 
sectoral planning or other national economic decision-making processes.  
The existence of these deficiencies therefore creates and leads to an environment of bad governance. 
That is to say, they contribute to an unstable macroeconomic framework; lack of transparency and lack of 
efficiency in fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy; frequently unsustainable budget deficits; wasteful 
expenditure and imbalances in sectoral allocations; and unpredictable decision-making processes that affect 
national economic activities and relationships with other economies and international bodies. Clearly, there is no 
unique institutional structure guaranteed to lead to economic growth and poverty reduction.  However, as noted 
in the World Development Report (2002), there must be a balance between state powers that allow public 
officials to deliver public goods within the framework of good economic governance, and ensure that public 
officials are constrained from using that power in an arbitrary fashion to serve only the interests of the privileged 
few.   
In Nigeria, there are obvious symptoms or characteristics of bad governance.  Governance 
institutions/infrastructure, such as the executive, legislature and the judiciary are weak because of corruption. 
The rule of law and adherence to formal rules are not rigorously observed. Political/public office holders are not 
constrained from using their power to embezzle public funds meant for the provision of public utilities. An 
instance could be found in the judicial process where over twenty corruption cases handled by Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (involving political office holders) since 1999 have suffered series of 
setbacks without a single conviction against any of the political office holders or a recovery of any kind.  
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TABLE 4: EFCC CASES AGAINST CORRUPT PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDERS  
States/Public office Offence 
 Abia State Criminal diversion of public funds in excess of 5billion Naira by public officers between 1999-2007 
Taraba state Corrupt enrichment to the tune of 1.3billion naira by public officers between 1999-2007. 
Jigawa State 36billion Naira carted away from treasury by senior public officers between 1999-2007 
 Enugu State  5.3billion Naira public funds diverted for personal use by public officers of the state between1999-2007 
House  of 
representatives 
10billion Naira contract over-invoicing 2003-2007.  
Corrupt enrichment of some members to the tune of 5.2billion Naira meant to fix power 
Nasarawa State 15billion Naira public funds carted away by public political office holders between 1999-2007 
 Senate   10million Naira unspent budget of Ministry of health carted away by house committee on health in 2010. 
Source: Ayorinde, www.villagesquare.com, 2013. 
 
Ayorinde (2013) chronicled over ten cases involving EFCC and public office holders in Nigeria. Table 4 above 
highlights a few of these cases. Interestingly, the list is endless and most of these public officers/offenders are 
currently holding political offices and enjoying political patronage as if it is a standard practice in Nigeria. 
Obviously, there is a clear lack of capacity by Federal and state governments and its agencies to give the country 
a good sense of direction in the management of public funds as public funds are corruptly diverted for selfish 
reasons and public infrastructure left in a complete state of disuse and decay. 
 The independence and professionalism of the public sector is eroded and the civil society lacks the 
means to bring public pressure to bear on the institutions of governance. There have been a consistent lack of 
transparency and lack of efficiency in fiscal, monetary and regulatory policy; frequently unsustainable budget 
deficits for over 33 years as shown in Table 5 with the attendant wasteful expenditure and imbalances in sectoral 
allocations; and unpredictable decision-making processes. The institutions of government do not have the 
capacity to manage resources efficiently; this situation has been made worse by corruption in governance in all 
its ramifications thereby impeding long-term foreign and domestic investment. In fact, frequently unsustainable 
budget deficits in Nigeria have been proxied for corruption in high places of government.  This is further 
buttressed by the result of the simple correlation analysis between budget deficit (BDF) and corruption (CORR) 
as shown in table 2 above. The result indicates that there exists a moderately positive correlation between budget 
deficit and corruption given the value 0.68. That means the two variables move in the same direction. This 
implies that as budget deficit increases, corruption also increases. 
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TABLE 5: BUDGET DEFICITS GROWTH RATE FROM 1974-2010 
Year Real GDP In Millions GDP Growth rate Deficits Deficits Growth rate Deficit  as a percentage of GDP 
1974 15,919.70 199.8 1,796.4           - 9.8 
1975 27,172.02 70.7 -427.9 -76.2 -2.0 
1976 29,146.51 7.3 -1,090.8 -154.9 -4.0 
1977 31,520.34 8.1 -781.4 -28.4 -2.4 
1978 29,212.35 -7.3 -2.821.9 -261.4 -7.8 
1979 29,947.99 2.5 1,461.7 48.2 3.4 
1980 31,546.76 5.3 -1,975.2 -35.1 -3.9 
1981 205,222.06 550.5 -3,902.1 -97.6 -3.8 
1982 199,685.25 -2.7 -6,104.1 51.89 -5.5 
1983 185,598.14 -7.1 -3,364.5 -49.04 -2.8 
1984 183,526.95 -1.1 -2,660.4 -20.92 -2.1 
1985 201,036.27 9.5 -3,039.7 -14.25 -2.1 
1986 205,971.44 2.5 -8,254.3 -171.5 -5.7 
1987 204,806.54 -0.6 -5,889.7 -28.6 -2.9 
1988 219,875.63 7.4 -12,160.9 -106.6 -4.4 
1889 236,729.58 7.7 -15, 134.7 -24.5 -3.7 
1990 267,549.99 13.0 -22,116.1 -46.1 -4.4 
1991 265,379.14 -0.8 -35,755.2 -61.7 -6.2 
1992 271,365.52 2.3 -39,532.5 -10.6 -4.3 
1993 274,833.29 1.3 -107,735.3 -172.5 -9.5 
1994 275,450.56 0.2 -70,270.6 -34.7 -4.8 
1995 281,407.40 2.2 1,000.0 98.5 0.0 
1996 293,745.83 4.4 32,049.4 3104.0 0.8 
1997 302,022.48 2.8 -5,000.0 -84.4 -0.1 
1998 310,890.05 2.9 -133,389.3 -2567.7 -3.3 
1999 312,183.48 0.4 -285,104.7 -113.7 -5.9 
2000 329,178.74 5.4 -103,777.3 -26.4 -1.5 
2001 356,994.26 8.4 -221,048.9 -113.0 -3.1 
2002 433,203.51 21.3 -301,401.6 -36.4 -3.8 
2003 477,532.98 10.2 -202,724.7 -32.7 -2.0 
2004 527,576.04 10.5 -172.601.3 -14.9 -1.5 
2005 561,931.39 6.5 -161,406.3 -6.6 -1.1 
2006 595,821.61 6.0 -101,397.5 -37.2 -0.6 
2007 634,251.10 6.4 -117,237.10 3.64 -0.57 
2008 674,889.00 6.4 -47,378.50 -64.9 -0.20 
2009 718,202.55 6.4 -810,008.46 -1609.96 -3.27 
2010 775,525.70 7.9 -1,105,439.78 -36.5 -3.80 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2010. Columns 3 & 5 are calculated by the Authors. 
A scrutiny of table 5 shows that there had been a deliberate budget deficits right from 1974 to 2007 and 
the deficit growth rate is higher than real GDP growth rate. Deficits as a percentage of GDP, except for some 
years, had consistently been on an average of 3.7 per cent high. It is equally worthy to note that an average of 60 
per cent of the huge government deficit public expenditure has been on recurrent expenditure and leaving a 
balance of only 40 per cent for capital expenditure. This may partly be responsible for government’s inability to 
fix infrastructures (including governance infrastructure) in Nigeria. There had also been a deliberate failure to 
institutionalize the basic norms of good governance (which in itself is due to corrupt practices) by government 
institutions. Ultimately, bad governance in Nigeria has generated some negative multiplier effects, thereby 
decreasing the capacity of the economy to provide public utilities, create jobs and by so doing improve the 
standard of living. 
5. Conclusion 
 According to Ribadu (2006), Nigeria’s previous leaders stole about 64 trillion naira (about US $507 
billion) from public coffers. When benchmarked against the 2008 budget of N2.456 trillion and 2011 budget of 
N4.972 trillion, this translates into 26 years and 12 years budgets respectively. The embezzlement of these public 
funds is made possible by corruptly over invoicing of public contracts on infrastructural provision. These “acts” 
lead to increased government expenditure on infrastructure as the government strives to build reliable 
infrastructure(s) in Nigeria. Edame et al (2011) discovered in their study that in spite of the increasing trend in 
public expenditure on infrastructure in Nigeria, the reality on ground appears dismal and that expenditure on 
infrastructure is higher in democratic regime than in the military. Interestingly, over the years, most 
governments, at state and federal levels in Nigeria have adopted due process (in principle) in projects execution 
as a way of checking excessive corrupt projects over-invoicing. This is supposed to allow for transparency and 
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accountability in governance. It is obvious that enhanced accountability in governance which in itself is an 
infrastructure promotes a prudent and efficient allocation and use of national resources. The major bottleneck in 
the adoption of due process in infrastructural supply in Nigeria is lack of adequate and proper monitoring 
mechanism to ensure the realization of the ultimate objectives. Most often, where a monitoring framework 
exists, it is not usually executed by persons who demonstrate the highest standards of personal integrity, honesty 
and justice. Therefore, apart from having a proper monitoring mechanism in place, it is necessary to have people 
with integrity and commitment to serve to be engaged in the monitoring process to ensure that  quality 
infrastructures are supplied as and when due. 
Also, the deepening of democratic structures and values wherein citizens become aware of their rights 
would help in this monitoring process. Ultimately, government and institutional players would know that they 
stand the risk of incurring the public’s wrath should they not live up to expectations. Drawing from the 
experience of Egypt, the civil society groups and the intellectuals have a role in this.   
 The current institutional reform in the electricity sector where the activities of the electric power 
industry are unbundled such that generation, transmission and distribution/supply are managed by separate 
enterprises is a welcome development. Government should vigorously pursue the option of public-private 
partnership (both local and foreign) in this sub-sector in order to mobilize resources in this sector and create a 
more competitive environment thereby injecting economic and technical efficiency into the industry. This would 
reduce the level of decay currently experienced in this sub-sector.  
 Other options include; the adoption of adequate and long term planning for infrastructural supply. This 
requires nation-wide surveys of demand for infrastructure (in order to obtain accurate statistical records) 
necessary for ascertaining/estimating the infrastructural needs of the country. Once this is resolved, 
infrastructural planning (demand forecasting and supply) will be more meaningful. Also, the education of the 
people on infrastructure maintenance and sustainability is very important. By and large, no one single policy 
option is viable enough to attain sustainable infrastructural supply in Nigeria; rather a combination of options 
will achieve this. In concluding, let us relate the issue of corruption to infrastructural decay in a depressed 
Nigerian economy. It is clearly established that a relationship exists between corruption and infrastructural decay 
in Nigeria. The correlation result shows some positive relationship between corruption and infrastructural decay. 
It is obvious that corruption weakens the governance infrastructure (and also accountability/transparency) and 
encourages disregard for the rule of law. When this happens, it becomes difficult for the government to provide 
and maintain other physical infrastructure that would have served as the wheels of economic activity. Therefore, 
promoting and institutionalizing the culture of good governance, transparency/ accountability and the culture of 
consistency in policy design and implementation is a desirable goal. Although, a number of obstacles may be 
encountered at least in the short run, a strong political will backed with action (strong social control measures) 
on the part of government will definitely lead to the achievement of the predetermined goals. 
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